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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
corded the same orderly trial as any other defendant.18
It is submitted that the power given courts to punish for
a direct contempt is an irregularity in our system that
guarantees due process of law. It seems to permit punishment
without actual due process of law. The summary punishment
power is given to the courts because they have already heard
the facts that would be brought out in the trial for contempt
and it enables the courts to preserve their existence and power.
The exercise of the formalities of law would not be an expe-
dient means of handling cases of direct contempt. The defend-
ant does not lose his rights; justice is afforded the defendant
by appeal if he feels the sentence received is excessive for the
contempt he has committed, or that the court has abused its
discretion.
CONRAD GREICAR
CONTRACTS - RESTRAINT OF TRADE OR COMPETITION IN
TRADE - CONSTRUCTION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS - The
Plaintiff, a partnership, sought to enjoin the defendant, an
ex-partner, from practicing medicine in violation of a restric-
'ive convenant entered into between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant in a contract for employment. The contract expressly
stated that should the defendant terminate his employment
with the plaintiff, he would refrain from practicing medicine
or surgery within a 25 mile radius for three years. Defendant
subsequently left the plaintiff's employ and soon thereafter
opened a practice within the area mentioned in the contract.
The Supreme Court of Iowa held, two judges dissenting,
that the injunction should be granted since the covenant
imposed restrictions which were reasonable as to time and
area and not in conflict with public policy.
The dissent considered the restriction as to area to be un-
reasonable, since there were few orthopedic surgeons practic-
ing within the heavily populated 25 mile radius, and therefore
the restriction was greater than necessary to protect the
plaintiff. Cogley Clinic v. Martini, 112 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa
1962).
Injunctive relief is granted not as an absolute right, but
18. People v. Spain, 307 Ill. 283, 138 N.E. 614 (1923).
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RECENT CASES
according to equitable principles, taking into account the facts
and circumstances of each case.1 It has long been held that the
test to be applied to restrictive covenants is one of reasonable-
ness.2 A covenant is usually held unreasonable and therefore
invalid if it fails to set a time limit; 3 imposes an undue hard-
ship on the defendant;4 unduly restricts the area in which the
defendant may engage in the same occupation;5 or is opposed
to the interests of the public.6 With this concept of reason-
ableness in mind, the courts tend to construe contracts of
this nature most strictly.7
The type of service performed must also be taken into con-
sideration. Contracts are generally held valid in the event
that the covenantee's business will be seriously injured if the
injunction is not granted.8 Similarily, when time and area are
specified and the restrictions are reasonable, contracts are
held valid which involve the sale. of goodwill9 or the dissolu-
tion of a partnership.10
Definite time and area limitations do not seem so important
in all jurisdictions. In the case of Lewis v. Krueger, Hutchin-
son and Overton Clinic,11 a time limit was not specified. None-
theless, the court imposed an injunction limited to three years,
on the basis that this time limit was "reasonable".12 A similar
contract, which also lacked a time limit, was held valid on
the basis that restraining the defendant from the practice
of medicine in the city of Chicago imposed no hardship upon
him as he was not restrained from practicing in any other
1. Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 360 Ill. 638, 196 N.E. 779 (1935).
2. Central v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353, 9 N.E. 629 (1887); Williams v.
Thompson, 143 Minn. 454, 174 N.W. 307 (1919).
3. Brecher v. Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d 377 (1945).
4. Mutual Loan Co. v. Pierce, 245 Iowa 1051, 65 N.W.2d 405 (1954)
"The benefit which the plaintiff could possibly gain by the enforcement
would be trivial and far out of proportion to the hardship to the defend-
ant." Tawney v. Mutual System of Maryland, 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372
(1946).
5. Droba v. Berry, 139 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1955).
6. Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 188, 30 S.E. 735 (1898); Tawney v.
Mutual System of Maryland, 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372 (1946).
7. Brecher v. Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d 377 (1945); Tawney v.
Mutual System of Maryland, 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372 (1946).
8. Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 Pac. 280 (1909); Federated
Mutual Implement & Hardware Insurance Co. v. Erickson, 252 Iowa 1208,
110 N.W.2d 264 (1961).
9. Burdine v. Brooks, 206 Ga. 12, 55 S.E.2d 605 (1949); Rowe v. Toon, 185
Iowa 848, 169 N.W. 38 (1918).
10. Bauer v. Sawyer, 8 Ill. 2d 351, 134 N.E.2d 329 (1956).
11. 153 Tex. 363, 269 S.W.2d 798 (1933).
12. Ibid.
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part of the state.13 No consideration was given to the possi-
bility that this period might extend well beyond the death
of the plaintiff or his withdrawal from the competitive prac-
tice of medicine. In at least one case the latter possibilities
have been held sufficient to invalidate a contract containing
such a covenant.14
North Dakota holds every contract in the restraint of
business void with exceptions of contracts involving the sale
of goodwill or dissolution of partnership. 15 In the only case
in point the covenant fell within neither of the two excep-
tions and was therefore void.' 6
In the above-mentioned case of Lewis v. Krueger, Hutchin-
son and Overton Clinic, 7 the defendant in error asked for
an injunction to enjoy violation of a restrictive covenant. If
the rule of strict construction had been followed, the injunc-
tion would have been denied, but instead the court took it
upon themselves to revise the contract and grant the injunc-
tion. It is submitted that normally this should be outside
the functions of the court.
Therefore, the better rule would seem to be that of strict
construction, as quite often when injunctive relief is granted,
there appears to be an infringement of private rights in regard
to free trade. Since these rights are basic to our economic
system of free enterprise, they must be preserved.
JOHN D. HOVEY
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW - REAL ESTATE BROKERS
- INCIDENT-TO-BUSINESS - The defendant, Ford Hoffman
Realty, was charged with advising a client that it was com-
petent and qualified to draft and prepare all the necessary
contracts, deeds, bills of sale and other instruments necessary
to the transaction; that the sellers permitted the defendants
to handle the transaction, including drafting of certain instru-
ments affecting the title to the real property, and that $8.00
13. Storer v. Brock, 351 Ill. 643, 184 N.E. 868 (1933).
14. Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 188, 30 S.E. 735 (1898).
15. N.D. Cent. Code § 9-08-06 (1961).
16. Olson v. Swendiman, 62 N.D. 649, 244 N.V. 870 (1932).
17. 153 Tex. 363, 269 S.W.2d 798 (1933).
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